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Optimal Download Cost of Private Information Retrieval
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Abstract
A private information retrieval scheme is a mechanism that allows a user to retrieve any
one out of K messages from N non-communicating replicated databases, each of which stores
all K messages, without revealing anything about the identity of the desired message index to
any individual database. If the size of each message is L bits and the total download required
by a PIR scheme from all N databases is D bits, then D is called the download cost and the
ratio L/D is called an achievable rate. For fixed K,N ∈ N, the capacity of PIR, denoted by C,
is the supremum of achievable rates over all PIR schemes and over all message sizes, and was
recently shown to be C = (1+1/N+1/N2+ · · ·+1/NK−1)−1. In this work, for arbitrary K,N ,
we explore the minimum download cost DL across all PIR schemes (not restricted to linear
schemes) for arbitrary message lengths L under arbitrary choices of alphabet (not restricted to
finite fields) for the message and download symbols. If the sameM -ary alphabet is used for the
message and download symbols, then we show that the optimal download cost inM -ary symbols
is DL = ⌈
L
C
⌉. If the message symbols are in M -ary alphabet and the downloaded symbols
are in M ′-ary alphabet, then we show that the optimal download cost in M ′-ary symbols,
DL ∈
{⌈
L
′
C
⌉
,
⌈
L
′
C
⌉
− 1,
⌈
L
′
C
⌉
− 2
}
, where L′ = ⌈L logM ′ M⌉.
1 Introduction
In the private information retrieval (PIR) problem [1, 2], we have K messages, stored at N dis-
tributed and non-communicating databases. A PIR scheme allows a user to retrieve any one of theK
messages, while revealing no information to any individual database about the retrieved message in-
dex. Typical quality measures of PIR schemes include communication complexity [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7],
computational overhead [8, 9, 10], storage overhead [11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19], upload cost
[20], download cost [11, 12, 14, 20, 18], and rate [20, 14, 18]. In this work we will focus on download
cost and rate. If the size of each message is L bits and the total download required by a PIR scheme
from all N databases is D bits, then D is called the download cost and the ratio L/D is called an
achievable rate. The capacity of PIR, denoted by C, is defined to be the supremum of achievable
rates over all PIR schemes and over all message sizes. It was shown recently in [20] that1
C =
(
1 +
1
N
+
1
N2
+ · · ·+
1
NK−1
)−1
(1)
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1We will use the symbol C to represent the expression in (1) throughout this paper.
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The reciprocal of capacity, 1/C, similarly represents the infimum of download cost per message
bit over all PIR schemes and over all message sizes. Fundamental information theoretic measures
such as these are essentially asymptotic in character, involving limits as message lengths L → ∞.
Remarkably, [20] shows that these asymptotically optimal values are also achieved exactly when the
message length parameter L is any integer multiple of NK . However, since in practice the message
length parameter L can be arbitrary, an important question that remains open is to determine
optimal download cost and rate values for arbitrary fixed values of L, in particular when L is not
an integer multiple of NK . In this work, we explore the minimum download cost across all PIR
schemes (not restricted to linear schemes) for arbitrary message lengths under arbitrary choices
of alphabet (not restricted to finite fields) for the message and download symbols. If the same
M -ary alphabet is used for the message and download symbols, then we show that the optimal
download cost in M -ary symbols is DL = ⌈
L
C ⌉. If the message symbols are in M -ary alphabet and
the downloaded symbols are in M ′-ary alphabet, then we show that the optimal download cost in
M ′-ary symbols, DL ∈
{⌈
L′
C
⌉
,
⌈
L′
C
⌉
− 1,
⌈
L′
C
⌉
− 2
}
, where L′ = ⌈L logM ′ M⌉. Correspondingly, the
maximum achievable rate is automatically characterized in every case as L/DL.
Notation: N is the set of natural numbers. For integers Z1, Z2, Z1 ≤ Z2, we use the compact
notation [Z1 : Z2] = {Z1, Z1 + 1, · · · , Z2}. Similarly, A[Z1:Z2]
△
= {AZ1 , AZ1+1, · · · , AZ2} for any
variable A. The notation X ∼ Y is used to indicate that X and Y are identically distributed. The
notation |A| is used to denote the cardinality of a set when A is a set, and the length of a tuple
when A is a tuple. For sets S1, S2, we define S1/S2 as the set of elements that are in S1 and not
in S2. For a permutation function λ(·) applied to some l-tuple U = (U(1), U(2), · · · , U(l)), we will
allow some abuse of notation to write λ(U) = (U(λ(1)), U(λ(2)), · · · , U(λ(l))).
2 Problem Statement
There are K messages W1, · · · ,WK , each of which is an arbitrary string of length L comprised of
M -ary symbols.
Wk =
(
Wk(1),Wk(2), · · · ,Wk(L)
)
∈ [0 :M − 1]L ∀k ∈ [1 : K] (2)
Note that there are ML possible distinct realizations of each message.
There are N databases. Each database stores all the messages W1, · · · ,WK .
Depending upon the desired message index θ ∈ [1 : K], the user follows one of K strategies.
These strategies are specified in terms of KN random queries, Q
[θ]
n , ∀n ∈ [1 : N ],∀θ ∈ [1 : K] that
are privately generated by the user a-priori, i.e., without any knowledge of the message realizations.
In order to retrieve Wθ, the user sends the query Q
[θ]
n to the n-th database, ∀n ∈ [1 : N ].
Upon receiving Q
[θ]
n , the n-th database returns an answering string A
[θ]
n , which is a function of
Q
[θ]
n and the data stored (i.e., messages W1, · · · ,WK). The answering string A
[θ]
n is comprised of
M ′-ary symbols, A
[θ]
n ∈ [0 :M ′ − 1]|A
[θ]
n |.
From all the information that is now available to the user (A
[θ]
[1:N ], Q
[θ]
[1:N ]), he must be able to
correctly decode the desired message Wθ. That is, the following correctness constraint must be
satisfied.
[Correctness] Wθ is a function of A
[θ]
[1:N ], Q
[θ]
[1:N ]. (3)
2
To protect the user’s privacy, the query presented to each database must be identically dis-
tributed regardless of the desired message index.
[Privacy] Q[θ]n ∼ Q
[θ′]
n , ∀θ, θ
′ ∈ [1 : K], n ∈ [1 : N ]. (4)
The download cost, D, for a PIR scheme is the maximum value (across all random realizations of
queries) of the total number of M ′-ary symbols downloaded by the user from all the databases.
D = max
N∑
n=1
|A[θ]n | (5)
Our goal is to characterize the optimal (minimum over all PIR schemes) download cost DL, for
arbitrary fixed message size L. The optimality is across all PIR schemes, i.e., including non-linear
PIR schemes.
3 Results
3.1 Optimal Download Cost for Matching Alphabet (M = M ′)
Consider the setting where the messages and downloads are comprised of symbols from the same
alphabet, i.e., M =M ′ ∈ N/{1}. Our main result for this setting appears in the following theorem.
Theorem 1 For PIR with N ∈ N databases, each storing all K ∈ N messages, each message
comprised of L ∈ N symbols from M -ary alphabet, M ∈ N/{1}, where the downloads are comprised
of symbols from the same M -ary alphabet, the optimal download cost is DL =
⌈
L
C
⌉
M -ary symbols.
The proof of converse (i.e., the impossibility claim) of Theorem 1 follows from the capacity result
of [20] and appears in Section 4. The achievability is proved, first for the case L = NK−1 in Section
5, and then for arbitrary L in Section 6.
Based on Theorem 1, the following observations are in order.
1. Given the message size and alphabet constraints, since the minimum download cost cor-
responds to the maximum rate, Theorem 1 equivalently characterizes the optimal rate for
arbitrary message size in the matching alphabet case, as L/⌈LC ⌉.
2. Reference [11] shows that when K ≥ 2 and N ≥ L + 1, then the optimal download is
DL = L+1. This result can be recovered as a special case of Theorem 1 by noting that when
K ≥ 2 and N ≥ L+ 1,
DL =
⌈
L
C
⌉
(6)
= L+
⌈
L
(
1
N
+
1
N2
+ · · ·+
1
NK−1
)⌉
(7)
= L+ 1 (8)
where (8) follows because 0 < 1N +
1
N2
+ · · · + 1
NK−1
< 1N−1 ≤
1
L . Theorem 1 completes the
picture by characterizing the optimal download cost for all N,K,L.
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3. Reference [20] presents a PIR scheme which achieves a rate equal to capacity C if L = nNK
where n ∈ N is any positive integer, so that the corresponding download is D = LC . This
result can be recovered as a special case of Theorem 1 by noting that when L = nNK , then
L
C = nN
K(1 + 1/N + · · ·+1/NK−1) = nN(1 +N + · · ·+NK−1) is a positive integer so that
DL =
⌈
L
C
⌉
= LC .
4. A naive extension of the PIR scheme of [20] to the setting when L is not an integer multiple
of NK , is obtained by padding zeros to each message so that the message lengths are rounded
up to the closest integer multiple of NK . The gap between the download cost of the naive
scheme and the optimal download cost in Theorem 1 can be unbounded. For an example, if
L = NK−1, then the download cost of the naive scheme is D = NK/C, while the optimal
download cost is DL =
⌈
L
C
⌉
= NK−1/C.
5. In the absence of any constraints on message lengths, we know from [20] that the maximum
achievable rate across all PIR schemes is the capacity C. For constrained message length L,
Theorem 1 shows that the maximum achievable rate is L/DL = L/
⌈
L
C
⌉
which is in general
less than C. The message length L = NK−1 is particularly significant in light of Theorem 1,
because this is the shortest message length for which the achieved rate equals the capacity
C. This is seen as follows. In order to achieve the capacity, the download cost must be
D = LC = DL which must be a positive integer value. But if L < N
K−1, then
D =
L
C
= L
(
1 +
1
N
+ · · ·+
1
NK−1
)
= L
(
1 +N + · · ·+NK−1
NK−1
)
/∈ N (9)
because NK−1 and 1+N + · · ·+NK−1 are co-prime. This is verified, e.g., through Bezout’s
identity,
NK−1(N) + (1 +N + · · ·+NK−1)(1 −N) = 1 (10)
3.2 Optimal Download Cost for Mismatched Alphabet (M 6= M ′)
Now consider PIR schemes with mismatched alphabet, i.e., the messages are represented in M -ary
alphabet, and the downloaded symbols are in M ′-ary alphabet, M ′ 6= M . For this setting the
optimal download cost to within 2 symbols is characterized in the following theorem.
Theorem 2 For PIR with N ∈ N databases, each storing all K ∈ N messages, each message
comprised of L ∈ N symbols from M -ary alphabet, M ∈ N/{1}, where the downloads are com-
prised of symbols from M ′-ary alphabet, M ′ ∈ N/{1}, M ′ 6= M , the optimal download cost
DL ∈
{⌈
L′
C
⌉
,
⌈
L′
C
⌉
− 1,
⌈
L′
C
⌉
− 2
}
, where L′ = ⌈L logM ′ M⌉.
The proof of Theorem 2 appears in Section 7.
The following observations place Theorem 2 in perspective.
1. The proof of Theorem 2 presented in Section 7 shows that the download cost
⌈
⌈L log
M′
M⌉
C
⌉
is
always achievable, and the download cost for any PIR scheme cannot be less than ⌈
L log
M′
M
C ⌉.
Therefore, in particular, when
⌈
⌈L log
M′
M⌉
C
⌉
= ⌈
L log
M′
M
C ⌉, the exact optimal download cost
is DL = ⌈
L log
M′
M
C ⌉.
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2. It is easy to create examples where mismatched alphabet leads to less efficient PIR schemes
than possible with matched alphabets. However, this is not always the case. The following
examples show how mismatched alphabet can in some cases be beneficial in terms of rate
relative to matched alphabet. Consider N = 2,K = 2, L = 3,M = 9. Here C = 2/3. The
highest rate achievable with matched alphabet (M ′ = M) is L⌈L/C⌉ = 3/5 < C whereas the
rate achieved with the mismatched alphabet M ′ = 3 < M , is
L log
M′
M
⌈L′/C⌉ = 2/3 = C. Similarly
one can construct examples with M ′ > M where mismatched alphabet produces a higher
rate than the best possible with matched alphabet, e.g., N = 2,K = 2, L = 3,M = 4 where
the best rate with matched alphabet is again 3/5 < C, but the mismatched alphabet M ′ = 8
achieves rate 2/3 = C.
4 Proof of Theorem 1: Converse
The converse for Theorem 1 is the impossibility claim, i.e., that no PIR scheme with matched
alphabet (M =M ′) can achieve a download cost smaller than DL = ⌈
L
C ⌉. This is proved as follows.
The message realizations are arbitrary, as is the choice of the desired message index θ ∈ [1 : K].
By arbitrary, what is meant is that all realizations are possible. Therefore the PIR scheme must
work for every possible realization of message symbols and θ. Any PIR scheme that works for
arbitrary realizations, will also work if they are uniformly randomly generated. Therefore, for the
converse argument let us assume uniform distributions on the realizations of message symbols, and
on θ. The advantage of assigning a distribution to these arbitrary quantities is that we are able
to use the information theoretic formulation of the PIR problem as in [20], and the upper bounds
on rate that are derived in [20] are also applicable in our current setting. In particular, C is still
an upper bound on the achievable rate of a PIR scheme with arbitrary message realizations and θ
and arbitrary message length L. Since capacity is an upper bound on the rate of all PIR schemes,
C ≥ L/DL, so that DL ≥
L
C , and because DL ∈ N, we must have DL ≥
⌈
L
C
⌉
.
5 Proof of Theorem 1: Achievability for L = NK−1
In [20], it is shown that the capacity (and the corresponding optimal download cost) of PIR is
achievable when L = NK bits. Here we present a more efficient PIR scheme to show that a smaller
message size, L = NK−1 bits (M -ary symbols in general), is sufficient to achieve a rate equal to C
(and the optimal download cost) when the alphabets are matched, i.e., M =M ′. This PIR scheme
is significant because (as noted in Section 3.1) L = NK−1 is the smallest message size needed to
achieve capacity, and also because it is the key ingredient that will allow us to subsequently expand
the achievability proof to arbitrary L in Section 6. Note that since the N = 1 case is trivial (optimal
to download all messages), we will consider only N ≥ 2 in this section.
The PIR scheme that we present here is closely related to the capacity achieving PIR scheme
presented in [20]. For both schemes the queries are comprised only of sums of symbols from various
messages. Since our new scheme considers M -ary alphabet, the “sums” are interpreted as modulo-
M sums. In both schemes no symbol appears more than once in the query for any particular
database. The difference between the two schemes lies in the requirement of symmetry across
databases. Recall that the PIR scheme of [20] is based on the iterative application of three steps
corresponding to symmetry across databases, symmetry across messages within the query to each
database, and exploiting side information. The key to reducing the message size from L = NK to
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L = NK−1 is to eliminate the requirement of symmetry across databases. Therefore, the new PIR
scheme for L = NK−1, formalized in the Q-Gen Algorithm in Section 5.4, is based on the iterative
application of the following two steps.
(1) Enforcing Message Symmetry within the Queries to Each Database: The goal is to make
the queries to a database symmetric with respect to messages. For instance if the query to
database 1 includes l instances of sums of symbols from messages W1,W2,W3, then it must
include l instances of sums of symbols from each of the
(
K
3
)
combinations of 3 messages.
Message symmetry is defined formally in Section 5.2. The procedure is formalized in the
M-Sym Algorithm, presented in Section 5.3. All the queries that do not involve desired
message symbols (I terms in the Q-Gen Algorithm) are introduced only through the M-
Sym algorithm.
(2) Exploiting Side Information: The goal of this step is to exploit queries from other databases
that were added to enforce message symmetry (and do not contain desired message symbols),
as side information to construct new queries which are sums of symbols from desired message
and the side information available from other databases. This step is formalized in the
Exploit-SI Algorithm, presented in Section 5.3. Except for an initialization step, all the
queries involving desired message symbols (M terms in theQ-Gen Algorithm) are introduced
only through the Exploit-SI algorithm.
Let us start with a few simple examples for small K,N values to illustrate the key ideas.
5.1 Examples
K = 2 Messages, N = 2 Databases, L = NK−1 = 2 Symbols Per Message
Let [a1, a2] represent a random permutation of L = 2 symbols from W1. Similarly, let [b1, b2]
represent an independent random permutation of L = 2 symbols from W2. The key to the privacy
of the scheme is that these random permutations are generated privately by the user and are
unknown to the databases.
Suppose the desired message is W1, i.e., θ = 1. The PIR scheme always starts by requesting
the first desired symbol (in this case, a1) from the first database (DB1). Applying Step (1), we
achieve message symmetry by including b1 from DB1. Next we apply Step (2) to exploit the side
information available at DB1, i.e., b1, in order to retrieve a new desired symbol a2 from the second
database (DB2) by mixing it with b1. At this point the query to each database is symmetric, and
there is no side information that remains unexploited. Thus the construction is complete.
DB1 DB2
a1
(1)
−→
DB1 DB2
a1, b1
(2)
−→
DB1 DB2
a1, b1 a2 + b1
Similarly, the queries for θ = 2 are constructed as follows.
DB1 DB2
b1
(1)
−→
DB1 DB2
a1, b1
(2)
−→
DB1 DB2
a1, b1 a1 + b2
Note that the application of Step (1) only introduces new terms that do not involve symbols from
the desired message, whereas the application of Step (2) only introduces new terms that involve
symbols from the desired message.
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To see why this scheme is private, recall that [a1, a2] are random permutations of two symbols
from W1 and [b1, b2] are random permutations of two symbols from W2. These permutations are
known only to the user, and not to the databases. Therefore, regardless of whether θ = 1 or θ = 2,
DB1 is asked for one randomly chosen symbol of each message, and DB2 is asked for a sum of a pair
of randomly chosen symbols from each message. Since the permutations are uniform, all possible
realizations are equally likely, and privacy is guaranteed. A formal proof of privacy for the general
setting appears in Section 5.6.
The scheme is correct, because each desired message symbol is either downloaded directly or as
a sum with side information terms that are separately downloaded.
Finally, note that the download cost is D = 3 = ⌈LC ⌉, because C = 2/3 for this case. The rate
achieved is L/D = 2/3 = C.
K = 3 Messages, N = 2 Databases, L = NK−1 = 4 Symbols Per Message
Let [a1, · · · , a4] represent a random permutation of 4 M -ary symbols from message W1. Simi-
larly, [b1, · · · , b4] and [c1, · · · , c4] are random permutations of 4 M -ary symbols each from messages
W2,W3, respectively. The uniformly random and independent permutations are generated privately
by the user. Suppose θ = 1. The query generation algorithm proceeds as follows.
DB1 DB2
a1
(1)
−→
DB1 DB2
a1, b1, c1
(2)
−→
DB1 DB2
a1, b1, c1 a2 + b1
a3 + c1
· · ·
· · ·
(1)
−→
DB1 DB2
a1, b1, c1 a2 + b1
a3 + c1
b2 + c2
(2)
−→
DB1 DB2
a1, b1, c1 a2 + b1
a4 + b2 + c2 a3 + c1
b2 + c2
Again, note that the application of Step (1) only introduces new terms that do not involve symbols
from the desired message, whereas the application of Step (2) only introduces new terms that
involve symbols from the desired message. The queries generated when θ = 2, 3 are as follows.
θ = 2 θ = 3
DB1 DB2
a1, b1, c1 a1 + b2
a2 + b4 + c2 b3 + c1
a2 + c2
DB1 DB2
a1, b1, c1 a1 + c2
a2 + b2 + c4 b1 + c3
a2 + b2
Correctness is straightforward, privacy is ensured by message symmetry and random permutations,
and the rate is L/D = 4/7 which matches the capacity C for this case. The download achieved is
D = 4 symbols which is also optimal.
K = 3 Messages, N = 3 Databases, L = NK−1 = 9 Symbols Per Message
Let [a1, · · · , a9], [b1, · · · , b9], [c1, · · · , c9] be three i.i.d. uniform permutations of symbols from mes-
sages W1,W2,W3, respectively. The query generation algorithm for θ = 1 proceeds as follows.
DB1 DB2 DB3
a1
(1)
−→
DB1 DB2 DB3
a1, b1, c1
(2)
−→
DB1 DB2 DB3
a1, b1, c1 a2 + b1 a4 + b1
a3 + c1 a5 + c1
· · ·
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· · ·
(1)
−→
DB1 DB2 DB3
a1, b1, c1 a2 + b1 a4 + b1
a3 + c1 a5 + c1
b2 + c2 b3 + c3
(2)
−→
DB1 DB2 DB3
a1, b1, c1 a2 + b1 a4 + b1
a6 + b2 + c2 a3 + c1 a5 + c1
a7 + b3 + c3 b2 + c2 b3 + c3
a8 + b3 + c3 a9 + b2 + c2
Again, note that the application of Step (1) only introduces new terms that do not involve symbols
from the desired message, whereas the application of Step (2) only introduces new terms that
involve symbols from the desired message. The scheme when θ = 2, 3 is as follows.
θ = 2 θ = 3
DB1 DB2 DB3
a1, b1, c1 a1 + b2 a1 + b4
a2 + b6 + c2 b3 + c1 b5 + c1
a3 + b7 + c3 a2 + c2 a3 + c3
a3 + b8 + c3 a2 + b9 + c2
DB1 DB2 DB3
a1, b1, c1 a1 + c2 a1 + c4
a2 + b2 + c6 b1 + c3 b1 + c5
a3 + b3 + c7 a2 + b2 a3 + b3
a3 + b3 + c8 a2 + b2 + c9
Correctness is straightforward, privacy is ensured by message symmetry and random permu-
tations, and the rate is L/D = 9/13 which matches the capacity C for this case. The download
achieved is D = 13 symbols which is also optimal.
Next we go beyond the simple examples to the general N,K setting. Let us start by introducing
some new definitions and notation, some of which is needed only to suppress those aspects of the
general setting that are notationally cumbersome but otherwise inconsequential.
5.2 Definitions and Additional Notation
[Uk] For all k ∈ [1 : K], define
2 ordered tuples
Uk , [Uk(1), Uk(2), · · · , Uk(N
K−1)] (11)
[k-sums, Types] We use the terminology k-sum to denote an expression representing the sum
of k distinct variables, each drawn from a different Ui tuple, i.e., Ui1(j1) + Ui2(j2) + · · ·+ Uik(jk),
where i1, i2, · · · , ik ∈ [1 : K] are all distinct indices. Furthermore, we will define such a k-sum to
be of type {i1, i2, · · · , ik}, or i[1:k] in our compact notation. If q represents a k-sum, the function
type(q) returns its type. Denote Tk as the set of all possible types of a k-sum, i.e., all possible
choices of k distinct indices in [1 : K]. Note that |Tk| =
(K
k
)
.
The next two items are introduced to facilitate a compact notation. The first of these is a
function, new(·), which will allow us to suppress unimportant details about symbol indices.
[The new(·) Function] For any ordered tuple U , let new(U) be a function that, starting with U(1),
returns the “next” element in U each time3 it is called with the same tuple U as its argument. So,
2The Uk symbols will eventually be mapped to random permutations of message Wk symbols. We use [Uk(l)]
instead of, say [al], [bl] as in the examples, because while the latter notation is more clear, it does not generalize to
K messages.
3We will deal with NK−1-tuples and the algorithms will guarantee that the new(.) function is not called more than
NK−1 times for the same tuple.
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for example, the following sequence of calls to this function: new(U2), new(U1), new(U1), new(U1) +
new(U2) will produce U2(1), U1(1), U1(2), U1(3) + U2(2) as the output.
[Ordered Access to Elements of a Set] In a similar spirit, for any set A, when accessing its
elements (e.g., in an algorithm), we will use the notation
−→
A to indicate that the elements of A are
to be accessed in some specified order, the details of which are not significant, because all ordering
rules will produce (possibly different) optimal PIR schemes. Let us assume by default that the
ordering is the natural lexicographic increasing order. For example,
−−−−→
[1 : K] refers to increasing
order of integers 1 through K.
−→
Tk denotes that the types, i.e., the {i1, i2, · · · , ik} terms in Tk
are individually sorted and then accessed in lexicographic increasing order. For a set Q that is
comprised of various k-sums the notation
−→
Q represents that the order in which the elements are
accessed is, first in increasing order of k, then within the same k in increasing order of type, and
then for multiple instances of the same type the elements are accessed in increasing order of the j
index of the Ui(j) with the smallest i. Some examples of this notation:⋃
k∈
−−→
[1:2]
{U1(k) + new(U2)} = {U1(1) + U2(1), U1(2) + U2(2)} (12)
⋃
q∈
−→
Q
{q + new(U1)} = {U1(1) + U2(4), U1(2) + U2(2) + U3(3), U1(3) + U2(3) + U3(2)}
(13)
where Q = {U2(2)+U3(3), U2(4), U2(3)+U3(2)}, so that
−→
Q denotes that the terms of Q are accessed
in the order U2(4), U2(2) + U3(3), U2(3) + U3(2).
[The Count(·) and Max(·) Functions] Count(Q, i[1:k]) denotes the number of k-sums of type
{i1, i2, · · · , ik} that are present in Q
Count(Q, i[1:k])
△
= |{q : q ∈ Q, type(q) = i[1:k]}|, (14)
Max(Q, k) denotes the maximum of the number of k-sums of the same type in Q, with the maxi-
mization being across all types of k-sums,
Max(Q, k)
△
= max
i[1:k]∈Tk
Count(Q, i[1:k]) (15)
[Message Symmetry]Message symmetry is defined as the condition that ∀k ∈ [1 : K], Q contains
equal number of k-sums for every type {i1, i2, · · · , ik} ∈ Tk.
Count(Q, i[1:k]) = Count(Q, i
′
[1:k]), ∀i[1:k], i
′
[1:k] ∈ Tk (16)
5.3 Two Subroutines
For the sake of clarity, here we separately present the two procedures needed to implement the
message symmetry and side-information exploitation steps, which will ultimately be incorporated
into the overall query generation algorithm.
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5.3.1 Algorithm (1): Achieving Message Symmetry (M-Sym Algorithm)
The algorithm takes as input a set Q comprised of various k-sums, and produces as output a set
Q∗ comprised of additional terms that need to be included in Q to make it message symmetric,
i.e., Q ∪ Q∗ satisfies message symmetry. For each k ∈ [1 : K], and for each type i[1:k] ∈ Tk, the
algorithm checks if there are Max(Q, k) instances of that type, and if not, then it generates as many
new instances as necessary to bring up the number of instances of that type to Max(Q, k).
Algorithm (1) M-Sym Algorithm.
1: Input: Q
2: Output: Q∗
3: Initialize: Q∗ ← ∅.
4: for k = 1 : K do
5: for each i[1:k] ∈
−→
Tk do
6: if Count(Q, i[1:k]) < Max(Q, k) then
7: for i = 1 : Max(Q, k) − Count(Q, i[1:k]) do
8:
Q∗ ← Q∗ ∪ {new(Ui1) + new(Ui2) + · · ·+ new(Uik)}
9: end for (i)
10: end if
11: end for (i[1:k])
12: end for (k)
Note that Q ∪ Q∗ satisfies message symmetry because for all types i[1:k] ∈ Tk, Count(Q ∪
Q∗, i[1:k]) = Max(Q ∪Q
∗, k) = Max(Q, k).
5.3.2 Algorithm (2): Exploiting Side Information (Exploit-SI Algorithm)
Algorithm (2) formalizes the side information exploitation step. This algorithm takes as input
N query sets Q1, Q2, · · · , QN , which are comprised of side-information terms, i.e., terms that do
not contain any desired message symbols, i.e., ∀n ∈ [1 : N ] and ∀q ∈ Qn, θ /∈ type(q) and which
have not previously been exploited. The algorithm produces N sets Q′1, Q
′
2, · · · , Q
′
N as output.
Q′n, n ∈ [1 : N ] is built by combining each element q in Q
′
1, · · · , Q
′
n−1, Q
′
n+1, · · · , Q
′
N with a “new”
variable Uθ (which corresponds to a desired message symbol).
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Algorithm (2) Exploit-SI Algorithm.
1: Input: Q1, Q2, · · · , QN
2: Output: Q′1, Q
′
2, · · · , Q
′
N
3: Initialize: All output are initialized as null sets.
4: for n = 1 : N do
5: for n′ = 1 : N and n′ 6= n do
6: for each q ∈
−→
Qn′ do
7:
Q′n ← Q
′
n ∪ {new(Uθ) + q}
8: end for (q)
9: end for (n′)
10: end for (n)
5.4 A Deterministic Query Generation Algorithm (Q-Gen Algorithm)
We now proceed to a query generation algorithm.4 The algorithm produces N query sets Q(DB, θ),
for all DB ∈ [1 : N ] as functions of θ. For internal book-keeping in the algorithm, we will partition
each query set into K subsets called blocks, such that block k ∈ [1 : K] contains only k-sums.
Further we will partition each block into two subsets denoted by I and M such that the M
partition contains only those types of k-sums which involve variables from Uθ, and the I partition
contains the remaining k-sums which do not involve the Uθ variables.
As in the simple examples presented earlier, for all DB ∈ [1 : N ], θ ∈ [1 : K], the query
sets Q(DB, θ) are built starting only from a single element in Q(1, θ), which is the first desired
message symbol Uθ, and then evolves through iterative application of the M-Sym and Exploit-SI
sub-routines. Note that the memory of calls to the new(·) function is assumed to be global, i.e.,
the memory is not reset when the sub-routines are called. Similarly, θ is assumed to be available
to the sub-routines as a global variable.
4Note that this is not the final step in the query generation. The output of this deterministic algorithm is in terms
of the Uk variables. The final step, to be presented in Section 5.5, maps Uk variables to private random permutations
of Wk variables, to produce the random queries that are then sent to the databases.
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Algorithm (3) Q-Gen Algorithm.
1: Input: θ
2: Output: Q(1, θ), · · · , Q(N, θ)
3: Initialize: All query sets are initialized as null sets. Also initialize Block← 1;
4:
Q(1, θ,Block,M)← {new(Uθ)} (17)
Q(1, θ,Block,I)←M-Sym(Q(1, θ,Block,M)) (18)
∀DB ∈ [2 : N ], Q(DB, θ,Block,M)← ∅, Q(DB, θ,Block,I)← ∅, (19)
5: for Block = 2 : K do
6:
(Q(1, θ,Block,M), · · · , Q(N, θ,Block,M))← Exploit-SI(Q(1, θ,Block−1,I), · · · , Q(N, θ,Block−1,I))
7: for DB = 1 : N do
8:
Q(DB, θ,Block,I)←M-Sym(Q(DB, θ,Block,M))
9: end for (DB)
10: end for (Block)
11: for DB = 1 : N do
12: Q(DB, θ)←
⋃
Block∈[K]
(
Q(DB, θ,Block,I) ∪Q(DB, θ,Block,M)
)
13: end for (DB)
Based on Algorithm (3), we have two immediate observations.
1. Consider the number of instances with type {i1, · · · , ik−1, θ} in Q(DB, θ, k,M), i.e.,
Count(Q(DB, θ, k,M), {i1, · · · , ik−1, θ}).
Q(DB, θ, k,M) is produced in Step 6 of Algorithm (3) as one of the outputs of the Expoit-SI
algorithm. From Step 7 of the Expoit-SI algorithm, we know that the instances with type
{i1, · · · , ik−1, θ} in Q(DB, θ, k,M) are produced by combining a new variable from Uθ with
each element of type {i1, · · · , ik−1} in Q(DB
′, θ, k − 1,I),DB′ 6= DB, i.e.,
Count(Q(DB, θ, k,M), {i1, · · · , ik−1, θ}) =
∑
DB′ 6=DB
Count(Q(DB′, θ, k − 1,I), {i1, · · · , ik−1})
∀DB ∈ [1 : N ], θ ∈ [1 : K], k ∈ [2 : K], {i1, · · · , ik−1} ∈ Tk−1 (20)
2. From Step 4 and Step 8 of Algorithm (3), we know that Q(DB, θ, k,I)∪Q(DB, θ, k,M),∀k ∈
[1 : K] satisfies message symmetry (16).
Structure of Q(DB, θ)
Key properties of Q(DB, θ) are summarized in the following lemma.
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Lemma 1 Q(DB, θ) produced by Algorithm (3) satisfies the following properties.
1. Q(DB, θ),∀DB ∈ [1 : N ], θ ∈ [1 : K] is a union of K disjoint sets (called “blocks”), that are
indexed by k ∈ [1 : K]. Block k only contains k-sums. For any type i[1:k] ∈ Tk, block k of
Q(DB, θ) contains v(DB, k) instances of type i[1:k], where v(DB, k) is a function only of DB, k.
2. ∀i ∈ [1 : K], if Ui(j) and Ui(j
′) appear anywhere in the same Q(DB, θ) then j 6= j′.
3. Exactly v(DB)
△
=
∑K
k=1 v(DB, k)
(
K−1
k−1
)
distinct variables for each Ui, i ∈ [1 : K] appear in
Q(DB, θ).
Proof:
1. Block k, k ∈ [1 : K] of Q(DB, θ) is the set Q(DB, θ, k,I) ∪ Q(DB, θ, k,M), which satisfies
message symmetry based on Observation 2. From Step 4 of Algorithm (3), we know that
Block 1 only contains 1-sums. From Steps 6 and 8, we know that the type of each instance
in Block k, k ∈ [2 : K] contains one more variable than that of any instance in Block k − 1.
Therefore, by induction, Block k only contains k-sums. As each Block k satisfies message
symmetry, we have
Count(Q(DB, θ, k,M), {i1, · · · , ik−1, θ}) = Max(Q(DB, θ), k) (21)
Count(Q(DB, θ, k − 1,I), {i1, · · · , ik−1}) = Max(Q(DB, θ), k − 1) (22)
and (20) reduces to
Max(Q(DB, θ), k) =
∑
DB′ 6=DB
Max(Q(DB′, θ), k − 1) (23)
Combined with the fact that Max(Q(1, θ), 1) = 1,Max(Q(DB, θ), 1) = 0,∀DB ∈ [2 : N ] (ob-
tained from Step 4 of Algorithm (3)), we conclude that Max(Q(DB, θ), k) depends only on DB
and k. Therefore, v(DB, k) = Max(Q(DB, θ), k) and v(DB, k) is a function of only DB, k.
2. Fix any database DB. Consider the case where i = θ first. Note that desired variables only
appear in Q(DB, θ,Block,M). From Step 4 and Step 6 in Algorithm (3), we see that the
desired variables, i.e., the Uθ variables appear only through the new(Uθ) function so that each
of them has a distinct index. Next, consider the non-desired variables, Ui, i 6= θ, which either
appear in Steps 4 and 8 through the new(Uk) function or appear in Step 6 which in turn
come from Q(DB, θ,Block−1,M) and each of them was introduced once through the new(Uk)
function and used exactly once. Therefore, these Uk variables also have distinct indices within
Q(DB, θ).
3. This claim follows directly from the previous two claims. Note that we have shown that all
variables from Ui are distinct, so v(DB) is equal to the number of times that variables in
Ui appear in Q(DB, θ). In the k-th block, Q(DB, θ) contains v(DB, k) instances of k-sums
of each type and there are
( K
k−1
)
types of k-sums that include i. Therefore, the number
of instances of tuple Ui in block k is v(DB, k)
(
K−1
k−1
)
. Summing over all K blocks, we have
v(DB) =
∑K
k=1 v(DB, k)
(K−1
k−1
)
.
13
According to Lemma 1 the query sets Q(DB, θ) are comprised of K blocks, the k-th block
contains v(DB, θ) instances of every possible type of k-sum, and no Ui(j) variable appears more
than once in Q(DB, θ). Therefore, the structure of the query set may be summarized in the following
corollary.
Corollary 1 Given DB, θ, for every Uk, k ∈ [1 : K], there exists its permutation Uk that depends
only on DB, θ, k,
Uk , λDB,θ,k(Uk) (24)
such that Q(DB, θ) can be expressed as
Q(DB, θ) =
⋃
k∈
−−−→
[1:K]
⋃
i[1:k]∈
−→
Tk
v(DB,k)⋃
l=1
{new(U i1) + new(U i2) + · · ·+ new(U ik)} (25)
Remark: As an example, consider the example with K = 3, N = 3, L = 9 that was presented
earlier in Section 5.1. Suppose DB = 2, θ = 3. The query Q(DB, θ) = Q(2, 3) is reproduced as
follows.
Q(2, 3) = {a2 + b2, a1 + c2, b1 + c3, a3 + b3 + c8},
which can be equivalently written in the form in Corollary 1 by setting
λ2,3,1(U1) = (a2, a1, a3, a4, a5, a6, a7, a8, a9) (26)
λ2,3,2(U2) = (b2, b1, b3, b4, b5, b6, b7, b8, b9) (27)
λ2,3,3(U3) = (c2, c3, c8, c1, c4, c5, c6, c7, c9) (28)
Note that here U1 = [a1, · · · , a9], U2 = [b1, · · · , b9], U3 = [c1, · · · , c9].
5.5 Mapping to Message Symbols to Produce Q
[θ]
DB
To produce the actual query sent to the databases, we map the Uk(i) variables to message symbols.
This mapping is specified by K privately chosen permutations γ1, γ2, · · · , γK , each of which is
uniformly random over all possible (NK−1)! permutations over the index set [1 : NK−1] and the
permutations are independent of each other and of θ. Specifically, Uk(i) is replaced with Wk(γk(i)),
∀k ∈ [1 : K], i ∈ [1 : NK−1]. This operator is denoted by Γ . For example, Γ({U1(2), U3(4) +
U5(6)}) = {W1(γ1(2)),W3(γ3(4))+W5(γ5(6))}. After this random mapping is applied to Q(DB, θ),
we obtain the actual query set Q
[θ]
DB that is sent to database DB.
Q
[θ]
DB = “Γ
(
Q(DB, θ)
)
” (29)
We use the double-quotes notation around a symbol to represent the query about its realization.
For example, while W1(1) is the realization of one message symbol, in our notation “W1(1)” only
represents the question: “what is the value of W1(1)?” Q
[θ]
DB is a (unordered) set and the questions
in the set are sent in an order that is independent of θ (say, uniformly random) to the databases.
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5.6 Proof of Correctness, Privacy and Optimality
We prove that the achievable scheme is correct, private and optimal in the following two lemmas.
Lemma 2 The PIR scheme constructed through the Q-Gen Algorithm is correct, i.e., it satisfies
(3). The message size is L = NK−1 and the download cost is optimal, D = LC .
Remark: LC is an integer, so that DL = ⌈
L
C ⌉ =
L
C .
Proof: Note that all desired message symbols are either retrieved directly with no interference
or they appear with interference q that is downloaded separately from another database so it can
be subtracted to retrieve the desired symbols. Therefore, all the desired message symbols are
retrievable and the correctness constraint (3) is satisfied.
In order to compute the message size and download cost, we proceed as follows. Using (23), we
have
v(1, 1) = 1 (30)
v(DB, 1) = 0,∀DB ∈ [2 : N ] (31)
v(DB, k) =
∑
DB′ 6=DB
v(DB′, k − 1),∀k ∈ [2 : K] (32)
⇒ v(2, k) = · · · = v(N, k),∀k ∈ [2 : K] (33)
For all k ∈ [2 : K],
v(1, k)
(32)(33)
= (N − 1)v(2, k − 1) (34)
v(2, k)
(32)(33)
= v(1, k − 1) + (N − 2)v(2, k − 1) (35)
⇒ v(1, k) + (N − 1)v(2, k)
(34)(35)
= (N − 1)v(2, k − 1) + (N − 1)
(
v(1, k − 1) + (N − 2)v(2, k − 1)
)
= (N − 1)
(
v(1, k − 1) + (N − 1)v(2, k − 1)
)
(36)
= · · · (37)
= (N − 1)k−1
(
v(1, 1) + (N − 1)v(2, 1)
)
(38)
(31)
= (N − 1)k−1 (39)
From Lemma 1, we have shown that there are v(DB) =
∑K
k=1 v(DB, k)
(K−1
k−1
)
desired variables
in each Q(DB, θ). Note that desired variables all appear through new(Uθ) so that they are distinct
across databases. Thus the message size (the total number of desired symbols that are retrieved)
is
L =
N∑
DB=1
K∑
k=1
v(DB, k)
(
K − 1
k − 1
)
(33)
=
K∑
k=1
(
v(1, k) + (N − 1)v(2, k)
)(K − 1
k − 1
)
(40)
(39)
=
K∑
k=1
(N − 1)k−1
(
K − 1
k − 1
)
=
K−1∑
k=0
(N − 1)k
(
K − 1
k
)
= (N − 1 + 1)K−1 = NK−1 (41)
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We next compute the download cost and show that the achieved download cost is optimal, i.e.,
D = LC . The k-th block of Q(DB, θ) contains v(DB, k) instances of k-sums of each possible type, and
there are
(K
k
)
possible types of k-sums. Therfore, the cardinality of Q(DB, θ) is
∑K
k=1 v(DB, k)
(K
k
)
.
Summing over all databases, we have
D =
N∑
DB=1
K∑
k=1
v(DB, k)
(
K
k
)
(42)
(33)
=
K∑
k=1
(
v(1, k) + (N − 1)v(2, k)
)(K
k
)
(43)
(39)
=
K∑
k=1
(N − 1)k−1
(
K
k
)
(44)
=
K−1∑
k=1
(N − 1)k−1
(
K
k
)
+ (N − 1)K−1 (45)
=
K−1∑
k=1
(N − 1)k−1
[(
K − 1
k − 1
)
+
(
K − 1
k
)]
+ (N − 1)K−1 (46)
=
K∑
k=1
(N − 1)k−1
(
K − 1
k − 1
)
+
K−1∑
k=1
(N − 1)k−1
(
K − 1
k
)
(47)
(41)
= NK−1 +
K−1∑
k=1
(N − 1)k−1
(
K − 1
k
)
(48)
= L+
1
N − 1
K−1∑
k=1
(N − 1)k
(
K − 1
k
)
= L+
1
N − 1
[
K−1∑
k=0
(N − 1)k
(
K − 1
k
)
− 1
]
(49)
= L+
1
N − 1
(NK−1 − 1) = L+NK−1
(
1
N −
1
NK
1− 1N
)
= L
(
1− 1
NK
1− 1N
)
=
L
C
(50)
Lemma 3 The PIR scheme constructed through the Q-Gen Algorithm is private, i.e., it satisfies
(4).
Proof: From Corollary 1, we know that Q(DB, θ) depends on θ only through the permutation
functions λDB,θ,k(Uk), for each k ∈ [1 : K]. But, Uk are uniform permutations of message symbols,
Uk = γk(Wk). Because any permutation of a uniform permutation is also uniform,
λDB,θ,k(γk(Wk))) ∼ γk(Wk). (51)
Furthermore, because γ1, γ2, · · · , γj are independent,
(λDB,θ,1(γ1(W1))), λDB,θ,2(γ2(W2))), · · · , λDB,θ,K(γK(WK)))) ∼ (γ1(W1), γ2(W2), · · · , γK(WK))
(52)
Since Q(DB, θ) is a function of (λDB,θ,1(γ1(W1))), λDB,θ,2(γ2(W2))), · · · , λDB,θ,K(γK(WK)))), which
is identically distributed for all θ ∈ [1 : K], Q(DB, θ) is also identically distributed for all θ ∈ [1 : K].
Thus condition (4) is satisfied and the scheme is private.
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6 Proof of Theorem 1: Achievability for Arbitrary L
The optimal PIR scheme is a combination (analogous to time sharing arguments in channel capacity
studies) of the capacity achieving scheme with message size L = NK−1 that was presented in the
previous section, and a PIR scheme from [11] (see the remark on replicated storage above Section V
of [11]) which is related to blind interference alignment as noted in [21] (see the discussion section
of [21]). Since the main objective of [11] is PIR with distributed storage, the scheme that we need is
recovered as an implicit special case of [11] (when replication coding is used across the databases).
To make the scheme explicit, we restate this result in the following theorem.
Theorem 3 [11] For PIR with N ≥ 2 databases, each storing K ∈ N messages, each message
comprised of L = N − 1 symbols from M -ary alphabet, M ∈ N/{1}, where the downloads are
comprised of symbols from the same M -ary alphabet, the download cost D = N = L + 1 M -ary
symbols is achievable.
While the scheme is implicitly contained in [11], for the sake of completeness we give an explicit
proof of Theorem 3 in Section 6.5. We also note that the binary alphabet (M = 2) case is considered
recently in [17] (see Construction 1 of [17]).
6.1 Examples
To convey the main ideas let us start with some examples for small values of K,N,L. The idea of
constructing the optimal achievable scheme is to greedily use the most efficient PIR scheme (the
capacity achieving scheme) repeatedly, and when the number of remaining symbols per message
is less than required, we turn to the next most efficient scheme (the scheme in Theorem 3), and
continue to use the scheme in Theorem 3 with possibly smaller and smaller message sizes until all
symbols are considered.
K = 2 Messages, N = 2 Databases, L = 3 Symbols Per Message
We show that the download cost D = ⌈LC ⌉ = ⌈3/(2/3)⌉ = 5 symbols is achievable. The scheme is
as follows. For each message, divide the L = 3 message symbols into two groups, where the first
group is comprised of 2 symbols and the second group is comprised of 1 symbol. For the first group,
we use the capacity achieving scheme with message length NK−1 = 2 so that the download cost
achieved is 2/C = 3 symbols. For the second group, we use the scheme described in Theorem 3 so
that the download cost achieved is N = 2 symbols. Adding the two, the overall download cost is
D = 5 symbols, as desired.
K = 3 Messages, N = 3 Databases, L = 16 Symbols Per Message
We show that the download cost D = ⌈LC ⌉ = ⌈16/(9/13)⌉ = 24 symbols is achievable. The scheme
is as follows. For each message, divide the L = 16 symbols into three groups, where the first
group is comprised of 9 symbols, the second group is comprised of 6 symbols and the third group
is comprised of 1 symbol. For the first group, we use the capacity achieving scheme with message
length NK−1 = 9 so that the download cost achieved is 9/C = 13 symbols. Note that the second
group only has 6 symbols per message so that we can not use the capacity achieving scheme and
we turn to the scheme in Theorem 3. For the second group, we further divide the 6 symbols to
3 sub-groups, each of which is comprised of 2 symbols. For each sub-group, we use the scheme
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described in Theorem 3 with N = 3 databases, so that the download cost per sub-group is N = 3
symbols. In total, the download cost for the second group is 9 symbols. Note now that the third
group only has 1 symbol per message so that even the scheme for the second group does not apply
and we turn to the same class of scheme but with shorter (matching) message length. For the
third group, we use the scheme described in Theorem 3 with N ′ = 2 databases (say, the first two
databases) and message size L′ = 1 symbol (matching the size of the third group), so that the
download cost achieved is N ′ = 2 symbols. Adding the download cost of the three groups up, the
overall download cost is D = 13 + 9 + 2 = 24 symbols, as desired.
6.2 Description of Achievable Scheme for Arbitrary L
We now describe the general achievable scheme for arbitrary L, following the examples presented
above. We first fully use the capacity achieving scheme with message size NK−1. To this end,
we view each NK−1 symbols as a group and proceed until the number of symbols that remain is
smaller than NK−1,
L = G1N
K−1 + L1 (53)
where G1 = ⌊
L
NK−1
⌋ and 0 ≤ L1 ≤ N
K−1 − 1. If L1 = 0, we are done. Otherwise, for the L1
symbols that remain, we fully use the scheme in Theorem 3 with N databases and message size
N − 1. We view each N − 1 symbols as a group and proceed until the number of symbols left is
smaller than N − 1,
L1 = G2(N − 1) + L2 (54)
where G2 = ⌊
L1
N−1⌋ and 0 ≤ L2 ≤ N−2. If L2 = 0, we are done. Otherwise, for the L2 ≥ 1 symbols
that are left, we use the scheme in Theorem 3 with L2+1 databases (say, the first L2 +1 ≤ N − 1
databases) and message size L2. Therefore the message size and the achievable download cost are
L = G1N
K−1 +G2(N − 1) + L2 (55)
D =
{
G1N
K−1/C +G2N if L2 = 0
G1N
K−1/C +G2N + L2 + 1 otherwise
(56)
This completes the description of our achievable scheme.
6.3 Proof that the Scheme is Correct and Private
Since we construct our PIR scheme as a concatenation of multiple PIR schemes, let us present
the following theorem to show that such a concatenation yields a PIR scheme that is correct and
private.
Theorem 4 For PIR with N ∈ N databases, each storing all K ∈ N messages, each message
comprised of L ∈ N symbols from M -ary alphabet, M ∈ N/{1}, where the downloads are comprised
of symbols from the same M -ary alphabet, if there are J ∈ N schemes with message length Lj , j ∈
[1 : J ] and download cost Dj, j ∈ [1 : J ], respectively, and the message lengths add up to L,
i.e.,
∑J
j=1Lj = L, then there exist a PIR scheme with message length L and download cost D =∑J
j=1Dj .
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Proof: The scheme is based on dividing the L message symbols to J groups so that the j-th group
is comprised of Lj symbols per message. Then we use the given scheme with message length Lj
for the j-th group, so that the download cost achieved is Dj symbols. Specifically, the queries for
each group are generated independently, given the same desired message index. Combining the
download cost for all J groups, we achieve the desired download cost. We are left to prove that
this symbol sharing scheme produces a correct and private PIR scheme.
Correctness is easy to see as the scheme for each group is correct. Privacy is proved as follows.
Consider any database n, n ∈ [1 : N ] and any desired message index θ, θ ∈ [1 : K]. Denote the
query of the scheme for the j-th group as Q
[θ]
n (j). Since the scheme for the j-th group is private,
we have that Q
[θ]
n (j) ∼ Q
[θ′]
n (j), for all θ, θ′ ∈ [1 : K] and ∀j ∈ [1 : J ]. Now since for any θ, the
queries for each group are generated independently, their joint probability distribution function is
the product of the marginal probability distribution functions, i.e.,
Pr(Q[θ]n (1), Q
[θ]
n (2), · · · , Q
[θ]
n (J)) = Pr(Q
[θ]
n (1))× Pr(Q
[θ]
n (2)) × · · · × Pr(Q
[θ]
n (J)) (57)
= Pr(Q[θ
′]
n (1)) × Pr(Q
[θ′]
n (2)) × · · · × Pr(Q
[θ′]
n (J)) (58)
for all θ, θ′ ∈ [1 : K]. Therefore the overall query for all groups is identically distributed regardless
of the index of the desired message θ, and the symbol sharing scheme is private (4).
6.4 Proof that the Achieved Download Cost D = ⌈L
C
⌉
We next show that the achievable download cost in (56) satisfies D ∈ [LC ,
L
C + 1) so that D = ⌈
L
C ⌉.
Note that in the converse proof, we have already shown that for all PIR schemes, D ≥ LC holds. So
we only need to prove that D < LC + 1. Here we have two cases.
Case 1: L2 = 0. We have
D <
L
C
+ 1 ⇔ G1N
K−1/C +G2N < (G1N
K−1 +G2(N − 1))/C + 1 (59)
⇔ G2N < G2(N − 1)/C + 1 (60)
When N = 1, we have G2 = 0 so that (60) holds. When N ≥ 2, plugging in C =
1−1/N
1−(1/N)K
=
NK−1
(
N−1
NK−1
)
, we have
G2N < G2
(
NK − 1
NK−1
)
+ 1 (61)
⇔ G2 < N
K−1 (62)
which holds because G2 = ⌊
L1
N−1⌋ ≤ L1 ≤ N
K−1 − 1 < NK−1.
Case 2: L2 ≥ 1. Note that when L2 ≥ 1, we have N ≥ 2 such that C =
1−1/N
1−(1/N)K
. As a result,
D <
L
C
+ 1 ⇔ G1N
K−1/C +G2N + L2 + 1 < (G1N
K−1 +G2(N − 1) + L2)/C + 1 (63)
⇔ G2N + L2 < (G2(N − 1) + L2)/C (64)
⇔ G2N + L2 < (G2(N − 1) + L2)
(
NK − 1
(N − 1)NK−1
)
(65)
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⇔
G2
NK−1
< L2
(
NK−1 − 1
(N − 1)NK−1
)
(66)
⇔ G2(N − 1) < L2(N
K−1 − 1) (67)
which is proved as follows
L2(N
K−1 − 1) ≥ NK−1 − 1 ≥ L1 = G2(N − 1) + L2 > G2(N − 1) (68)
Thus the proof is complete.
6.5 Proof of Theorem 3
We now present the scheme with download cost D = N and message length L = N − 1. Consider
Wk =
(
Wk(1),Wk(2), · · · ,Wk(N − 1)
)
,∀k ∈ [1 : K] (69)
where each Wk(i), i ∈ [1 : N − 1] is an M -ary symbol.
The queries are specified as follows. To retrieve Wθ privately, the user first generates a random
vector of length (N − 1)K, [h1(1), · · · , h1(N − 1), · · · , hθ(1), · · · , hθ(N − 1), · · · , hK(N − 1)], where
each element is uniformly distributed over {0, 1}. Then the queries are set as follows.
Q
[θ]
1 = [h1(1), · · · , hθ(1), · · · , hθ(N − 1), · · · , hK(N − 1)]
Q
[θ]
2 = [h1(1), · · · , hθ(1) + 1, · · · , hθ(N − 1), · · · , hK(N − 1)]
· · ·
Q
[θ]
N = [h1(1), · · · , hθ(1), · · · , hθ(N − 1) + 1, · · · , hK(N − 1)]
The answer from each database is a linear combination of the message symbols, where the combining
coefficients are given by the query received by that database.
A
[θ]
1 =
K∑
k=1
N−1∑
i=1
hk(i)Wk(i)
A
[θ]
2 =
K∑
k=1
N−1∑
i=1
hk(i)Wk(i) +Wθ(1)
· · ·
A
[θ]
N =
K∑
k=1
N−1∑
i=1
hk(i)Wk(i) +Wθ(N − 1)
The user decodes Wθ(i), i ∈ [1 : N − 1] by subtracting A
[θ]
1 from A
[θ]
i+1, with no error. Therefore,
the PIR scheme is correct.
Privacy is guaranteed because each query is independent of the desired message index θ. This
is because regardless of the desired message index θ, each query Q
[θ]
n ,∀n is individually comprised
of elements that are i.i.d. uniform over {0, 1}.
Each answer is comprised of 1 symbol, so the download cost achieved is D = N symbols. The
proof is complete.
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7 Proof of Theorem 2
7.1 Converse
First let us prove the converse. As in the converse proof of Theorem 1, the PIR capacity [20]
provides a general upper bound on rate, and therefore a general lower bound on download cost for
any given message length, which holds regardless of the choice of alphabet used to represent the
messages and download symbols. For message length L and download cost D, the rate is L log2(M)D log2(M ′)
which cannot exceed capacity. Therefore we automatically have the lower bound on download cost
as D ≥ L log2(M)C log2(M ′)
, and because D ∈ N, we must have
D ≥
⌈
L log2(M)
C log2(M
′)
⌉
(70)
7.2 Achievability
For the proof of achievability, let us construct a simple (sub-optimal) PIR scheme whose download
cost is nonetheless guaranteed to be within 2 M ′-ary symbols of the lower bound. The scheme is
described as follows.
Let us map the messages from M -ary alphabet to M ′-ary alphabet. Each message is comprised
of L symbols that are from an M -ary message alphabet, i.e., for each message there are ML
possible distinct realizations. L′ symbols from M ′-ary alphabet are capable of representing M ′L
′
distinct realizations. To have distinct representations for distinct message realizations, we must
have M ′L
′
≥ ML. For this, L′ = ⌈L logM ′ M⌉ is sufficient.
5 Now the message symbols and the
download symbols are from the same M ′-ary alphabet, so that we can use the PIR scheme used
to establish achievability in Theorem 1 to achieve download cost D = ⌈L
′
C ⌉, measured in M
′-ary
download symbols. Next let us prove that even for this simple scheme, the gap to optimality is no
more than 2 M ′-ary symbols.
Since the N = 1 case is trivial (optimal to fully download all messages), let us assume N ≥ 2.
Note that for N ≥ 2 it is always true that C ≥ 1/2, i.e., 1/C ≤ 2. Starting with the general upper
bound (70), ⌈
L′
C
⌉
≥ DL ≥
⌈
L log2(M)
C log2(M
′)
⌉
(71)
=
⌈
L logM ′(M)
C
⌉
(72)
≥
⌈
⌈L logM ′(M)⌉ − 1
C
⌉
(73)
=
⌈
L′
C
−
1
C
⌉
(74)
≥
⌈
L′
C
− 2
⌉
(75)
=
⌈
L′
C
⌉
− 2 (76)
5The sub-optimality of the scheme becomes obvious here because, for example if M ′ is much larger than M , then
we could jointly code all K M -ary messages symbols to only 1 M ′-ary message symbol, therefore download cost of 1
M ′-ary symbol would be enough, whereas our naive scheme will download at least 1/C symbols.
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8 Conclusion
Recent work has characterized the capacity, C (supremum of the ratio of message size over download
cost, i.e., L/D) of PIR when the message size L→∞. In this work, we have shown that for arbitrary
fixed message size L ∈ N, when the messages and downloads are comprised of symbols from the
same arbitrary M -ary alphabet, the optimal download cost is DL = ⌈
L
C ⌉; and when the messages
and downloads are comprised of symbols from different alphabets (messages from M -ary alphabet
and downloads from M ′-ary alphabet, M 6= M ′), the optimal download cost (in M ′-ary symbols)
DL ∈
{⌈
L′
C
⌉
,
⌈
L′
C
⌉
− 1,
⌈
L′
C
⌉
− 2
}
, where L′ = ⌈L logM ′ M⌉.
An interesting feature of our PIR scheme is that it allows arbitrary M -ary alphabet (not re-
stricted to finite fields). This is because the scheme downloads only direct sums modulo-M of
various message symbols. As the next step in this direction the extension to TPIR (PIR with
T -privacy) may be of interest. The capacity of TPIR for unconstrained alphabet is characterized
in [22], and the capacity achieving scheme presented there relies on finite field operations (mul-
tiplications) and existence of MDS codes. PIR schemes based on finite fields can be extended to
arbitraryM -ary alphabet by decomposingM into its prime factors and concatenating PIR schemes
over the finite fields corresponding to the prime factors. However, the extension may be difficult
when field size constraints imposed by arbitrary M -ary alphabet are incompatible with the MDS
code requirements.
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